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MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES WHEN PROPERTY
IS WRONGFULLY TAKEN BY A PRIVATE-
INDIVIDUAL.
W HERE chattels, or land, are not destroyed, nor taken by
condemnation proceedings, but are taken by a private
person, what shall be the measure of damages for the loss? Shall
it be the value as of the time of taking or of the time of demand?
Shall it be the same whether the injury is caused innocently or.
knowingly? Shall the loss always be measured by compensatory
damages, or shall exemplary damages sometimes be allowed?
These are some of the questions that come flocking to meet one
as he enters this interesting field of legal thought.
The loss may be occasioned in any one of three different ways:
A person may appropriate another's chattels, or sever a part of his
land and appropriate it as chattels, either inadvertently or know-
ingly but not maliciously, or maliciously. The party injured may'
seek his redress through an action in replevin, or conversion, or
trespass. So that the question of the measure of damages for the-
wrongful taking of one's property arises in nine different ways.
If a person injured elects to sue in trespass, he may recover
exemplary damages, if the act is wanton, or malicious; the dimin-,
ished value of his land, that is the value in place of the articles
removed together with any injury to the freehold by reason of the
removal, if there is a wrongful entry on his land; and the actual
value to him of the things taken, if they have no market value;
but, in this form of action, he may also recover for any enhanced
value given to the chattels by the labor of the wrongdoer, if not
through inadvertence.'
If the person injured sues in conversion, or trover, exemplary
damages are recoverable as in the case of a suit in trespass if the'-
act is malicious; the enhanced value given to the chattels by the
labor of the wrongdoer, if the act is done knowingly; but only
the value at the time of taking, or after severance in case of sever-
ance from realty (though some cases hold that the value should be
1 Engle v. Jones, 51 Mo. 36; Brown v. Allen, 35 Ia. 306; cases infra.
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before severance, or in place), with interest, if the taking is inad-
vertent and innocent.1
If the person injured prefers to sue in replevin, he is entitled in
the alternative, either to damages, as in the case of conversion, or
the return of the chattels, whether taken knowingly or inadver-
tently, unless the advertent wrongdoer changes them in species, or
so increases them in value that the original chattels are mere acces-
sories and the new value is out of all proportion to the original, or
confuses them with other goods of unequal grade, but if he requires
the return of chattels taken by an innocent wrongdoer, or by an
innocent purchaser from an intentional wrongdoer, in either case
he is required to compensate such innocent party for the enhanced
value given by him.2
These propositions, which are generally adhered to, suggest a
number of questions, and the first is regarding exemplary damages.
These are not allowed on any theory of compensation to the in-
jured party, but rather for the purpose of punishing the wrongdoer
and as a warning to others. Do such damages have any place in
civil actions? The writer thinks not. This question has been so
often discussed that it is becoming somewhat threadbare, and it is
not his purpose to enter into any extended treatment of the same,
but merely to give a sort of summary of the arguments against the
awarding of exemplary damages, especially for violation of prop-
erty rights. There are two kinds of wrongs, public and private,
the former violating the rights which inhere in the people as a
whole, and the latter the rights which belong to some individual.
The remedy for the violation of a public right is criminal punish-
ment, of a private right, redress, which can be accomplished either
by the restoration of that of which a person has been deprived, or
by awarding him compensation therefor. The early idea of private
vengeance has been supplanted by the criminal law, so that there
is no longer any place for it in civil law, and place cannot be made
for it by talking about punishing a person for the public and for
the sufferer in the right of the public. The allowance of exem-
1 White et al v. Yawkey, loS Ala. z70; Beede v. Lamprey, 64 N. H. 51o; Gaskins
v. Davis, zi5 N. C. 85 ; Eaton v. Langley, 65 Ark. 448; Wooden Ware Co. v. United
States, io6 U. S. 43 z ; Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291 ; McLean Co. Coal Co. v. Long,
8i Ill. 359; Single v. Schneider, 24 Wis. 299; Winchester v. Craig, 33 Mich. 205;
Tuttle v. White, 46 Mich. 485; Nesbitt v. St. Paul Lbr. Co., z Minn. 491.
2 Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379; Wetherbee v. Green, 2Z Mich. 3i; Pratt v.
Bryant, 20 Vt. 333; State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 62 Minn. 99; Eaton v. Langley,
65 Ark. 448.
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plary damages puts a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense,
contrary to provisions in State and Federal constitutions, for,
though the same wrong is inflicted, the fine awarded as punish-
ment in the civil action does not prevent indictment and prosecu-
tion in a criminal action, and punishment in a criminal suit is not
admissible in mitigation of exemplary damages. The purpose of
these provisions is to prevent double prosecutions for the same
offense, and when, in addition to the civil wrong, the same act is
split up into two further offenses criminal in nature, whether one is
called private and the other public, or both are called public, this
purpose is violated, and the accused is harassed with two prosecu-
tions. No hypothesis, however ingenious, can cloud the mind to
the fact that exemplary damages put a man in jeopardy once, and,
if he is also punished criminally for the same offense, he is "twice
put in jeopardy." Again, when assessed exemplary damages,
the accused is really punished for a criminal offense without the
safeguards of a criminal trial. He is summoned into court to make
compensation for a purely private injury, with no issue upon a
criminal charge presented; punishment by fine is inflicted without
indictment or sworn information; the rules of evidence as to crim-
inal trials are rejected; the doctrine of reasonable doubt is replaced
by the rule of preponderance of evidence; the defendant is com-
pelled to testify against himself; and, though in criminal offenses
the law fixes a maximum penalty which is imposed by the court,
the jury is entirely free to assess exemplary damages, subject only
to the power of the court, unwillingly exercised, to set aside the
verdict. The procedure and principles of criminal law are disre-
garded, the rules of damages are forgotten, and the machinery of
justice is used for the avowed purpose of giving the plaintiff that to
which he has no shadow of right. He recovers compensation for
all direct and consequential injuries resulting from a breach of con-
tract or a tort; for the loss of property, of time, of earning capac.
ity, of profits, of reputation, of services and society, for expenses,
for physical pain, for mental suffering, for injuries to result in the
future as well as those which have already flowed from the wrong;
and then, in addition to all this, after exact justice has been meted
out between the contending litigants so far as it is possible to do
so, he is allowed to recover exemplary damages, not for any injury
he has sustained, but as a punishment to the wrongdoer and as an
example to others. The doctrine is altogether inconsistent with
sound legal principles and it is unfortunate that it ever found lodg-
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ment in the law, and we look with' admiration upon any court
brave enough to disown and abandon it'
Passing by the cases of malicious injury, as only involving ex-
emplary damages, we come to suits in trespass, conversion and
replevin, both where the injury is caused knowingly but not mali-
ciously and where it is caused inadvertently, and the first question
to suggest itself here is whether there should be any difference in
the measure of damages in the different cases.
Before proceeding further, we should note that in these cases
the question of the allowance of exemplary damages does not
arise, for there is lacking that malicious, or wanton, or reckless
conduct necessary to warrant the punishment of the offender, even
where the doctrine of exemplary damages prevails. It is true that
this distinction is not always noticed. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota 2 and other courts have given as a reason why a wilful
wrongdoer has to pay greater compensation than an innocent is
because "he is entitled to no consideration, and it is just, as a
punishment to him and a warning to others, that the full penalty
be visited upon him, although the plaintiff gains thereby." But
this announces a wrong principle. Conduct must be more vindic-
tive than this before any court can allow exemplary damages.
Here the measure of damages is determined by the court, exem-
plary damages are determined by the jury. Here the damages are
awarded as a matter of right, exemplary damages are awarded as
a matter of discretion. Whatever damages are recoverable for
either the inadvertently, or the knowingly but not maliciously,
taking of another's property are compensatory in character.
Can a difference in the measure of damages be predicated on the
nature of the action or the fact of knowledge on the part of the
-wrongdoer? For any legal injury he has sustained, the party in-
.jured is entitled to just compensation, and no more. He is entitled
to be placed in the same situation, so far as money can do so, as
though no wrong had been committed. He has a right to be made
whole again. To give him any less than this still leaves him an
injured party; there is some injury not redressed. But, to give
him any more than this, instead of exactly redressing his injury,
causes a new injury to the first wrongdoer, who is now the injured
party. Hence, no matter what the form of the action, the object
,is the same, and a different rule of damages should not and does
1 8 Eng. Rul. Cas. 36o-38z; x L. R. A. Dig. 933-937.
2 State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 62 Minn. 99.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
not prevail, in trespass, conversion and replevin, except when
circumstances of aggravation are relied upon. Unless vindictive
damages are sought a person is restricted to compensation for his
,pecuniary loss. There is no reason or principle why for the same
injury the measure of damages should be different in one form of
tort action than in another; the loss is the same, and the redress
should be the same; to hold otherwise is to permit the form of the
action rather than the actual injury, to fix the damages. That a
person sometimes recovers more in trespass than in conversion is
due to the fact that he is suing for a different injury, or injuries.
For example, he may sue in trespass for injuries to chattels and
land, but if he sues in conversion or replevin he sues only for the
injuries to the chattels. There is as little foundation for a dis-
tinction between a case where an injury is caused knowingly, but
not in such a way as to call forth exemplary damages, and a case
where it is caused inadvertently. A man is damaged just as much
whether the injury is caused by mistake or intentionally, and what-
ever rule of damages is adopted in one case should be adopted in
the other. A, innocently, and B, intentionally, trespass upon C's
land and cut some of his timber, each cutting the same quantity
and grade. A has caused C just as great an injury as has B. A
and B each transports to distant markets the timber which he has
cut and works it up into lumber, the value of the lumber which A
holds being identical with the value of that B holds. B has now
caused C no greater loss than has A. There should be no differ-
ence in the measure of damages because either of the form of the
action, or because of the intent with which the wrongful act is
done.
At last we are ready for the question, What shall be the measure
of damages? Shall it be the value at the time of taking, or the en-
hanced value? Having decided that the rule should not vary with
the form of the action nor the intent of the wrongdoer, the next
and most difficult question which arises is the determination of
what that rule shall be. The true measure of damages for an
injury of this sort is the enhanced value at the time of demand, or
suit. At the time of the taking the owner has not sustained all the
injury that it is possible for him to sustain from the loss of his
chattels, nor is that all the injury which the wrongdoer causes him,
so that the injured party is entitled only to compensation for the
injury caused by the taking with interest on that amount to the
time of trial. His title and right to the possession of the property
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continue. He does not have to consider it converted unless he
so desires. He has a right to treat it as converted at any time
between the time of taking and the commencement of the action.
The title can be changed only by an agreement of the parties, or a
satisfaction of a judgment, except where an innocent party changes
the identity of the chattels, or so increases their value that it is out
of all proportion to the original value. Hence the injured party is
entitled at any time, before the running of the statute of limita-
tions, to the return of his property or to its value. This the cases
all hold, in the case of an intentional wrongdoer. But, apparently,
this is not the general holding of the courts in the case of an inad-
vertent wrongdoer. It is the object of this article to show that the
courts either do not or ought not to make such a distinction. It
is hoped that the last has already been done; it remains to explain
the apparent conflict in the adjudicated cases.
The real difficulty in the situation is not seen when we look
simply at the party who has lost his property'; we must look at
the party who has taken it, or who has purchased it from the
taker. Suppose that the latter takes a colt, when it has very little
value, that he feeds and cares for it two years, that he puts it into
the hands of an expert trainer, until it becomes a valuable race
horse, worth three thousand dollars. Suppose that a trespasser
cuts timber, and mostly by his own labor and expense increases
it in value three or four times. Suppose that this occurs with
any one of a thousand things. Shall the one who thus enhances
the value of a thing lose all the fruits of his labor? If he all the
time knows that he is conferring these benefits upon another party,
yes; but, if he is ignorant of this fact and is acting bona fide and
innocently, no. The courts are right in drawing the sharp dis-
tinction which they have drawn between the cases of intentional
and inadvertent trespasses, but many of them have made a mis-
take as to the remedy to be applied. The solution for all the
difficulties here arising lies, not in announcing different rules, or
measures, of damages, for the loss which the original owner has
sustained, but in finding some right of action for the innocent
party who has added his labor to the other's chattels. This is
found in quasi contracts. After this enhancement in value, both
parties have an interest in the property. The wrongdoer has an
equitable interest in the property to -the extent that he has in-
creased its value by his labor bestowed upon it in good faith. Ac-
cordingly when sued by the original owner, whether in replevin
MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
or in conversi'on, he is entitled to set up a counterclaim for the
reasonable value of the benefits which he bestows upon the
original owner when the latter elects to accept them by bringing
suit. This is not the difference between the value of the property
at the time of taking and suit, but the value of the benefits which
the wrongdoer innocently bestows, not to exceed that amount.
The increased value is the joint result of the original material and
the work and materials expended by the laborer, with sometimes
an independent cause, like a better market, contributing to the
enhanced value. The wrongdoer, though innocent, is not entitled
to all this: the ordinary measure of damages in quasi contracts
is the true criterion, and the benefits for which he is entitled to
recover are only those which he has added to the chattels after
severance, where land is taken and converted into chattels and
improved, for the trespasser has added no value to the land; he
can recover for only the added value he has given the chattels.
On this last point there is conflict in the English and American
cases, the rule in the case of minerals severed being stated so as
to include all improvements since they were in place, but it is
believed that in general the rule here announced is correct
The rule of damages adopted and applied by many of our state
courts and by our United States Supreme Court is unjust and an
outrage on the rights of property. By the rule of these tribunals,
instead of the owner receiving the profits that are made from the
objects of his ownership, the profits are given to the trespasser.
This is nothing more than judicial robbery. It is allowing one
man to take another's property without paying any compensation.
The true rule should compensate the innocent party for the labor
and expense he has bestowed upon the chattels to the extent their
value is enhanced thereby, but it should give all the other advan-
tages of ownership to the owner. Thus, if A inadvertently tres-
passes on B's land and cuts timber, when its value standing is three
dollars a thousand and after severance four dollars a thousand, and
he then transports it to his saw-mill and saws it up into boards at
a total expense of five dollars a thousand, but at that time and
place the value of the lumber is twenty dollars a thousand, B
should be allowed to sue A in any form of action and recover
either the lumber or its present value of twenty dollars, less five
dollars a thousand. That is, in a suit in conversion, he should
recover fifteen dollars, whereas, according to the cases criticized,
he would at the most recover only four dollars a thousand, and A
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would put the eleven dollars of profit into his pocket; and, though
not in this ratio, this is exactly what some of our largest lumber
companies have been doing for years. Adopt the rule and meas-
ure of damages here contended for and there will be less incentive
to become innocent trespassers. The wrong, if any, has been
caused by the courts, and it should be righted by the courts.
The only limitation upon the allowance of counter damages for
benefits conferred is that the courts should exercise great caution
in protecting wrongdoers, and only allow them compensation where
there is the plainest case of innocence. It is an easy thing for one
to claim that he has purchased property in entire good faith, and
an easier thing to claim that through innocence and mistake he
has unintentionally trespassed over the boundary line of his land
and cut timber on another's land, especially if the land trespassed
upon happens to belong to the state. There is nothing which has
thrown more discredit upon the law than the spectacle given us
by some of the courts sitting near the great lumber regions of our
country in their endeavors to discover inadvertence in the conduct
of some great lumber companies, which have grown rich upon
their stealings of timber from private and state lands. But if these
courts would adopt the theory herein set forth there would be less
likelihood of their giving us another such a spectacle, for it is not
so easy to prove a quasi contract as to prove inadvertence, where
the latter is one's business.
By the use of this conception of quasi contracts, the law of
damages is freed from inconsistencies; true compensation, the
ambition of the law, is accomplished by one uniform perfect rule;
the serfdom of form is thrown off; and at the same time complete
and careful justice is awarded to all parties, innocent and wilful,
sufferers and wrongdoers, owners, trespassers, and purchasers.
Hugh Evander Willis.
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.
